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Digital Surveillance and Preventive Policing
MANUEL A. UTSET*
INTRODUCTION
Modern police departments use “Big Data” technologies1 to collect
digital information about almost every aspect of our public and private
lives,2 storing it in large data banks,3 and processing it, as needed, to
extract actionable knowledge,4 used to solve and prevent crimes.5 For
example, police departments routinely feed data about past crimes into
sophisticated learning algorithms to help them “predict” the timing and
location of future crimes.6 This Article refers to law enforcement’s use of
*

William & Catherine VanDercreek Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Florida
State University College of Law. I would like to thank Richard Borden, Hillary Greene, Mariko
Hirose, Justin Hurwitz, and Harvey Rishikof for their comments.
1
“Big Data” is a catchall term used to refer to a variety of tools and methods for acquiring,
storing, and processing large data sets to extract useful knowledge. See Andrea De Mauro, Marco
Greco, & Michele Grimaldi, What is Big Data? A Consensual Definition and a Review of Key Research
Topics, 13 AIP CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 97, 101–03 (2016) (setting forth various uses of the term
Big Data); Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data: The Management Revolution, HARV. BUS.
REV. 60, 62–63 (October 2012) (describing advances in using large datasets to make business
decisions, including advancements in storage capacity, real-time capture of large amounts of data, and
increase in variety of data available).
2
See, e.g., Susan Landau, Making Sense from Snowden: What’s Significant in the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY 54, 57–59 (July–August 2013) (describing collection
of metadata and actual content data by U.S. intelligence agencies); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 353–69 (2015) (describing growth in
collection and use of large volume of data by police departments); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by
Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42–55 (2014) (describing
various ways in which police use surveillance data).
3
See Mél Hogan and Tamara Shepherd, Information Ownership and Materiality in an Age of Big
Data Surveillance, 5 J. INFO. POL. 6, 9–11 (2015) (discussing the NSA’s Utah Data Center, a 100,000
square-foot facility built to store surveillance intercepts).
4
See infra Section II.G. (discussing machine learning algorithms used to extract patterns from big
data sets and make predictions).
5
Growing concerns about terrorism have led intelligence agencies and law enforcement to invest
heavily in surveillance technologies aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. See e.g., David Lyon,
Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC. 1, 2
(2014) (stating that urban policing and anti-terrorism, along with consumer marketing and health care
are four main areas that make use of Big Data).
6
See Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in
Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 952–68 (2016) (providing a detailed
overview of how predictive policing algorithms work). For example, PredPol, a popular machine
learning program for “predictive policing,” uses historical data about crime type, crime location, and
crime date and time, to provide “crime predictions for the places and times that crimes are most likely
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Big Data as “digital policing.”
With the continued growth of digital policing, policymakers and
commentators have focused their attention on a plethora of privacy and
criminal procedure issues.7 But digital policing has other, less obvious,
effects on the criminal justice system: on police practices, deterrence
policy, and substantive criminal law. These collateral effects of digital
policing, largely overlooked by commentators and policymakers, are the
focus of this Article.
Digital policing helps reduce the criminal justice system’s overall
complexity, creating economies of scale in law enforcement and allowing
police departments to better deploy their limited resources.8 After a crime
has occurred, digital policing gives the police quick access to evidence
from multiple sources,9 including repositories of historical data, helping
them to identify offenders and make arrests.
Increased worries about terrorist attacks have led policymakers to
focus increasingly on preventing crimes rather than solving them after the
fact. This shift in enforcement focus, which we will refer to as “preventive
policing,” has been aided and complicated by the proliferation of
information available to law enforcement. The shift towards preventive
policing has implications for substantive criminal law, since it leads the
police to give greater attention to inchoate crimes, such as criminal
attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, and increases the risk of inappropriate
entrapment.
Section I describes the general economics approach to criminal law,
which posits that offenders are rational actors and that lawmakers design
legal rules and punishment schemes so as to maximize social welfare. The
Article adopts this general approach to analyzing criminal misconduct,
enforcement policies, and deterrence schemes.
Section II begins by examining the complexity of the criminal justice
to occur.” See How PredPol Works: We Provide Guidance on Where and When to Patrol, PREDPOL,
http://www.predpol.com/how-predpol-works/.
7
See e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment
of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to
Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069 (2014); Ferguson, supra note
2; Joh, supra note 2.
8
Los Angeles Police Chief Charlie Beck’s testimonial on the website of the predictive policing
software company, PredPol, makes the point: “I’m not going to get more money. I’m not going to get
more cops. I have to be better at using what I have, and that’s what predictive policing is about. . . . If
this old street cop can change the way that he thinks about this stuff, then I know that my [officers] can
do the same.” PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/.
9
For example, during the investigation of a crime on a subway platform, the police may review
CCTV camera footage. See Manal Al-Rawahi & E.A. Edirisinghe, Video Forensics in Cloud
Computing: The Challenges & Recommendations, 3 J. INFO. SCI. & COMPUTING TECH. 201, 205–07
(2015) (providing an overview of practical and legal issues in using CCTV footage for evidentiary
purposes).
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process. It then shows that digital policing techniques help reduce the
complexity of law enforcement and create economies of scale. It continues
by showing that ex ante preventive policing is a more complex undertaking
than ex post investigative policing. In particular, by reducing the
complexity of law enforcement, digital policing has allowed society to
shift its enforcement focus from investigative policing to preventive
policing, which is a much more complex undertaking. Section II concludes
by discussing the various social costs and benefits associated with digital
policing.
Section III examines how digital policing affects deterrence policy.
Given its economies of scale, digital policing allows police to increase
their ex ante monitoring and ex post investigations. By increasing the
efficiency of law enforcement, digital policing allows authorities to make
more arrests and get more convictions. Digital policing, in short, allows
society to increase the expected sanctions of crimes. This can lead to
inefficient overdeterrence. This Section first shows that digital policing
will increase the overall deterrence of offenders. It then examines a wellknown puzzle in the economic literature—the fact that repeat offenders are
punished more harshly—and shows that the proliferation of digital and
preventive policing should lead to the opposite conclusion: that gross
sanctions for repeat offenders should be lower. But society has failed to
adjust gross criminal sanctions to account for the widespread adoption of
digital policing. This Section continues by providing various explanations
for the stickiness of gross sanctions. The Section also describes how digital
policing can affect the likelihood of wrongful acquittals and wrongful
convictions.
Section IV develops a number of other criminal law implications of
digital and preventive policing. It examines the interaction between
preventive policing and inchoate crimes, such as criminal attempt,
conspiracy, and solicitation, as well as its relationship with the entrapment
defense. It also examines the implications of digital and preventive
policing on police searches, plea bargains, and police corruption.
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW
This Section describes the general economics approach to criminal
law. It begins by describing the way that rational offenders make decisions
about whether to violate the law. It then provides a justification for
assuming that offenders either act in a rational manner or, if they fall short,
they do so notwithstanding a preference to act rationally. The Section then
describes how a lawmaker whose goal is to maximize aggregate social
welfare would go about determining and implementing a scheme of
optimal criminal sanctions.
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A. Rational Offenders
The economics approach to criminal law assumes that criminal
offenders are rational. An actor acts “rationally” if, given a specific goal,
she chooses the best means to achieve it.10 This is a general statement, but
it helps set up the framework of the type of rationality—instrumental
rationality—that will be our focus.11 A few comments will help clarify the
approach.
Under instrumental rationality, we assume that people have specific
goals—for example, to go to Chicago, rob a bank, or become a
professional baseball player—which we take as givens and do not
question.12 We further assume that people with goals will take the requisite
steps to bring them to fruition.13 Given these assumptions, we judge an
individual’s behavior as “rational,” if the individual, when choosing among
the different courses of actions available to her, chooses the one best suited
for achieving her stated goal.
1. The Decision to Violate the Law
Under the economics approach to criminal law, rational offenders are
driven by a particular, rather generic, goal: to maximize their utility or
overall happiness.14 Rational offenders commit crimes that give them a net
gain in utility,15 or alternatively, crimes whose expected benefits exceed
the expected costs.16 An offender’s benefits from misconduct may include
increasing his wealth, retaliating against perceived social unfairness,
10
See John C. Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior, in RATIONALITY IN
ACTION: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 271, 272 (Paul K. Moser ed., 1990).
11
The concept of rationality in economics, however, is narrower; it assumes that actors make
decisions using a well-defined preference relation to compare and order the various alternatives
available to them. This preference relation is complete, in that every positive alternative in the relevant
choice set is comparable; it also satisfies transitivity—if the individual prefers a over b and b over c,
she prefers a over c. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 6–7 (1995)
(defining preference relations that are “rational”).
12
But see Aurel Kolnai, Deliberation Is of Ends, 62 ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 195, 196 (1962)
(calling into question whether someone who has set for themselves a certain goal did not by necessity
already engage in the same type of goal-driven deliberation).
13
See Joseph Raz, The Myth of Instrumental Rationality, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 13 (positing
that one with stated ends who fails to take the proper means to achieve it acts irrationally).
14
One may question whether utility maximization is an appropriate goal to have and whether
society should take steps to help its members achieve this goal. But the economics approach to criminal
law asks us to accept this utility maximizing goal as being a valid one, normatively speaking.
15
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219–20 (6th ed. 2003) (stating that
under the economics approach to criminal law, offenders are assumed to be rational, and thus choose to
commit crimes when they will yield expected benefits that are greater than the expected costs).
16
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 47 (2000) (stating that offenders violate the law if and only if the expected
utility from doing so, considering the expected benefits and sanctions, exceeds the utility that they
would get from obeying the law).
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getting accepted by his peers, or the mere act of hurting someone else. An
offender’s costs may include monetary fines, imprisonment, social stigma,
ostracism, lawyer’s fees, anxiety, and numerous other tangible and
intangible sources of disutility.
2. The Goal of Acting Rationally
Why would an offender want to behave rationally? Because the
consequences of violating the law can be severe. They can lead to loss of
liberty and, in some cases, loss of life. Rational offenders are more likely
to succeed in their criminal endeavors. So even when their behavior falls
short of full rationality, it is not for lack of trying or because they had a
preference to behave in a non-rational manner.18 Irrational offenders no
doubt exist. But we will exclude them from consideration, since our
concern is with instrumentally rational offenders who, by definition,
deliberate about the best ways of achieving their goals.19
B. Deterring Rational Offenders
Under the economics approach, the goal of the criminal justice system
is to maximize social welfare.20 That is, to maximize the aggregate utility
of all actors affected by criminal misconduct, particularly: actual and
potential victims; taxpayers, who pay for the criminal justice system
(which includes the police, prosecutors, public defenders, courts, and the
prison system); and offenders. Including the offender’s welfare in the
17
See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 89 (1990)
(cataloguing immediate rewards of crime); JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME, MORAL AND SENSUAL
ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL 312 (1988) (arguing that criminals take “delight in deviance” and “take
pride in a defiant reputation as ‘bad’”). Offenders may also get immediate utility from using criminal
activity as a form of retaliation against perceived injustice. See Vai-Lam Mui, The Economics of Envy,
26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311, 312 (1995) (exploring “the role of envy in provoking sabotage or
retaliation against others” and stating that “envy plays an important role in social and economic life”);
William Terris & John Jones, Psychological Factors Related to Employees’ Theft in the Convenience
Store Industry, 51 PSYCHOL. REP. 1219, 1225 (1982) (finding that revenge is one of the major
motivators of employee theft).
18
We will assume therefore that offenders have a second-order preference to act rationally and to
hold rational beliefs. See Richard C. Jeffrey, Preferences Among Preferences, 71 J. PHIL. 377, 381
(1974) (discussing how people choose their preferred preferences).
19
Individuals who go through life thoughtlessly acting according to whatever desire they happen
to be feeling at the time would not be very effective as criminals. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT, ESSAYS 47, 50 (1988) (arguing that the ability of people to
form second-order preferences regarding what first-order desires they want to ultimately motivate them
is an important part of what it means to be a person).
20
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
180–81 (1968) (describing the goal of minimizing the social costs of crimes); Nuno Garoupa, The
Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURVEYS 267, 269 (1997) (providing overview of the
optimal law enforcement model); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1194, 1196 (1985) (applying utilitarian approach to various areas of substantive
criminal law).
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social welfare calculus is controversial, particularly in the case of violent
crimes. But under the economics approach, the goal is not necessarily to
foreclose all criminal activity.21
Some crimes, like murder, rape, and armed robbery, require total
deterrence because they produce harm that is so serious in nature that it
trumps any plausible legitimate benefits to criminals.22 However, there are
a series of less harmful offenses, including regulatory crimes, that, while
serious, do not necessarily call for total deterrence—at least not from an
economic standpoint.23
1. Optimal Deterrence
When crimes do not call for total deterrence, a lawmaker will set the
expected sanctions equal to the expected harm of the illegal behavior. This
will assure that a rational offender will commit a crime only when it
produces a net gain for society; that is, only when his net expected benefits
(after taking the expected sanctions into account) are at least as great as the
social harm. If a crime produces a social harm of $100, the expected
sanctions will also be set at $100.24 An offender who receives $300 from
the crime will choose to offend, and by doing so, maximize social welfare;
on the other hand, an offender who receives only $75 from the crime will
choose to obey the law, which again maximizes social welfare.
2. Total Deterrence
Crimes, like murder, rape, and armed robbery, that call for total
deterrence can be deterred by setting the expected sanctions at a level that
greatly exceeds the benefits that offenders would hope to receive. While
there is no danger of overdeterring offenders, a lawmaker must still make
sure that the sanctions for these serious crimes are well-calibrated.25 A
lawmaker who punishes all of these crimes with the same maximal
21
See Becker, supra note 20, at 180–81 (calculating aggregate welfare by taking into account the
benefits offenders receive from their criminal activity).
22
See Posner, supra note 20, at 1196–97, 1215–16 (discussing criminal activity, much falling
under the rubric of common law crimes, that society has determined calls for total deterrence).
23
In fact, the law and economics approach to criminal sanctions is based on the same general
principles used to determine the optimal damages for torts, where the goal is to provide actors with the
right incentives when choosing their activities and level of care, rather than completely dissuading them
from engaging in those activities. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 474–79 (2004) (discussing analogous strict liability and fault-based rules in tort and criminal law
contexts).
24
The gross sanctions will often have to be higher, to account for the probability that an offender
will escape prosecution. When an offense produces a harm, h, and the probability of detection is p, the
optimal sanction is h/p. In our example, if the probability that the offender will be identified, arrested,
and successfully prosecuted is 0.5, the optimal gross sanction is $200, assuming that offenders are risk
neutral. This gross penalty would assure that the expected sanctions and expected harm both equal
$100, the desired result.
25
See infra Section III. F. (discussing marginal deterrence under a system of digital policing).
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sanction—say, life in prison—can end up giving offenders perverse
incentives. A bank robber who knows that robbery and murder both carry
the same penalty will have an incentive to kill eyewitnesses. To avoid
these marginal deterrence misincentives, less serious total deterrence
crimes must be punished less severely than the more serious ones, like
murder and rape.
3. Fines and Imprisonment
Society can punish offenders using monetary fines, prison sentences,26
or some combination of both. All things being equal, fines impose fewer
social costs than do prison sentences. Fines are a one-time wealth transfer
from the offender to the state, and thus create few administrative or
deadweight costs. Imprisonment, on the other hand, creates significant
social costs, such as the costs of administering the prison system and of
providing offenders with greater procedural safeguards. Imprisonment also
creates opportunity costs: inmates are not as economically productive as
their counterparts outside of prison.27 Given the goal of maximizing social
welfare, a lawmaker would first attempt to punish offenders with fines,
resorting to prison sentences only in cases in which an offender is unable
to pay the fine.28
C. How Much Should Society Spend on Enforcement?
When setting expected sanctions, a lawmaker has to decide how high
to set the gross sanctions and how much to invest on law enforcement. All
things being equal, the more that society invests on law enforcement, the
higher the probability that offenders will be punished, and thus the higher
the expected sanctions. But law enforcement is costly. Society must spend
resources to determine that a crime occurred, and to identify the offender
and bring him to justice. The second way to increase expected sanctions is
to increase the gross sanctions. As a general matter, this will be a more
economical option than trying to increase the probability of detection.
As a result, under the economics approach, if a crime is being punished
with a fine, the lawmaker should first increase the fine as high as

26
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J.
PUB. ECON. 89, 89–90 (1984) (discussing various ways of trading off monetary fines and prison terms).
27
See POSNER, supra note 15, at 223 (arguing that imprisonment causes a depreciation of skills
and a loss of contacts that impairs a convict’s productivity post-parole and thus causes depreciation in
the convict’s human capital).
28
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 51 (stating that sanctions via fines should be
exhausted first before using prison sanctions because fines are wealth transfers and are generally
cheaper to collect than the social costs of imprisonment); see also SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 482
(discussing underdeterrence when offenders do not have sufficient levels of wealth to pay fines
necessary to properly deter them).
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29

possible. If the optimal expected sanctions are $1,000 and offenders can
afford a fine of up to a $100,000, a lawmaker should set the probability of
detection at 1% and the gross fine at $100,000. Assuming that the
administrative costs of fines do not increase with the level of the fine
(which will not always be the case because offenders facing higher fines
may attempt to hide assets), any investment in enforcement that increases
the probability of detection above 1% would be wasteful.
As we saw above, imprisonment is a costlier option than fines. In cases
in which offenders are unable to pay fines, and imprisonment is the only
option, a lawmaker will need to compare the added administrative costs
from increasing the gross prison sentence with the added law enforcement
expenditures needed to increase the probability of detection.30
II. COMPLEXITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE
This Section examines the complexities of law enforcement and of the
criminal justice process. It begins with a brief overview of how individuals
go about making decisions in complex environments. The Section
continues by examining the overall complexity of the criminal justice
process. It shows that complexity is exacerbated by the need of various law
enforcement officials to coordinate their behavior. It then describes the
relative complexity of ex ante preventive policing and of ex post
investigative policing. It shows that, all other things being equal,
preventive policing is a more complex undertaking than investigative
policing. The Section then argues that the proliferation of digital policing
techniques can be seen as a natural reaction to the growing complexity of
the criminal justice process, in general, and of policing, in particular.
While digital policing has a greater number of moving parts, they are
deployed in manners that reduce the overall complexity of law
enforcement. The Section concludes by examining the social benefits and
costs associated with digital policing.

29
This was one of the important insights in Gary Becker’s work on optimal criminal deterrence.
See Becker, supra note 20, at 190–93 (describing the trade-off between the magnitude of sanctions and
enforcement expenditures to increase probability of detection); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of
Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 368–69 (1992) (describing the optimal trade-off between higher
sanctions and enforcement costs when offenders are imperfectly informed of probability of detection).
30
Not all increases in enforcement costs will provide a sufficiently high return in reducing the
harm from misconduct; thus, to economize these costs, society will sometimes opt for underdeterrence.
If there is underdeterrence, then it does not follow that when a criminal is observed in misconduct,
social welfare is increased. See SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 488–89 (arguing if there is underdeterrence,
the fact that someone engaged in misconduct does not signal that her expected benefit exceeds the
expected harm).
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A. What Is “Complexity”?
A complex system is one that is difficult for someone to quickly and
fully comprehend. A system’s complexity increases with the number of
distinct parts that it has,31 and the way those parts interact.32 The less
transparent those interactions, the greater the system’s complexity. It
follows that one can reduce complexity by making more salient and
transparent how the various parts of a system interact. One can also reduce
complexity by “hiding” the interaction between different parts of the
system. For example, the value of a publicly traded security depends on the
preferences and plans of thousands of potential traders. However, if the
capital markets are efficient, the security’s equilibrium market price
encapsulates all information relevant to its valuation.33
B. Why Complexity Matters: Bounded Rationality of Decision-Makers
As we saw above, a rational actor in pursuit of a goal will choose the
course of action best suited for achieving that goal. This means that a
rational decision-maker will, at a minimum, process and use all
information in her possession that would help reduce her decisional
uncertainty. But a decision-maker facing a quick decision may not have the
time or cognitive ability to process this information quickly enough.34
When a decision-maker leaves information “on the table” due to time and
cognitive constraints, she exhibits “bounded rationality.”35 Bounded
rationality can lead to costly decisional mistakes that could be avoided if
the decision-maker had the time and ability to fully use all of the
information. Complex information by definition requires more time and
31
See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 215 (3d ed. 1996) (“How complex
or simple a structure is depends critically upon the way in which we describe it. Most of the complex
structures found in the world are enormously redundant, and we can use this redundancy to simplify
their description. But to use it, to achieve the simplification, we must find the right representation.”).
32
See SIMON, supra note 31, at 183–84 (explaining that a complex system is “one made up of a
large number of parts that have many interactions,” where its complexity will increase whenever, given
“the properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the
properties of the whole”).
33
See Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When Traders Have
Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573–74 (1975) (stating that in a competitive market the
equilibrium price summarizes all relevant information in the market).
34
See James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL
J. ECON. 587, 594 (1978) (stating that limits of rationality stem from the fact that “decision-making
impose[s] demands on the scarce resources of a finite capacity human organism”).
35
Bounded rationality increases with the cognitive load or psychic cost that a decision-maker
must expend to make sense of the decision environment. See HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
THOUGHT 3 (1979) (stating that “human thinking powers are very modest” compared to the complexity
of decision environments, and describing “satisficing” decisions due to deliberation using only a subset
of the available and relevant information set); SIMON, supra note 31, at 29 (describing the rational
decision-maker as “a satisficer, a person who accepts ‘good enough’ alternatives, not because less is
preferred to more but because there is no choice”).
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cognitive effort to process and use. It follows that the costs associated with
bounded rationality will tend to increase with the information’s overall
complexity.
C. The Complexity of the Criminal Justice Process
The complexity of the criminal justice process is due in part to the
large number of different types of actors involved, as well as the overall
complexity of the environment in which crimes play out.
1. The “Relationships” Forged by a Crime
When offenders violate the law, they create a number of explicit and
implicit relationships with (and between): victims, witnesses, investigators,
prosecutors, judges, juries, and innocent individuals who may be mistaken
for the real offender. More specifically, when a crime is committed, the
offender and the victim become a “pair” of components within a subsystem
of the criminal justice system. An eyewitness is an additional component,
one that is interconnected to the offender, the victim, and the offendervictim pair. When a police officer investigates the crime, she too becomes
part of that crime’s subsystem, with analogous interconnections to the
other individual and group components. The same is the case for the
prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and jury.
Each of these actors will have to try to make some sense of the overall
set of relationships and about specific relationships. A police officer,
prosecutor, and jury will have to try to determine the reliability of an
eyewitness. To the extent that the witness has a prior relationship with
either the offender or the victim (or both), the undertaking will be more
complex than in cases in which the witness is a total stranger. Similarly,
the relationship between an offender and his victim may be simple or
complicated to understand, depending on whether they had a prior
relationship.
2. The Complexity of Policing
Law enforcement is a complex enterprise. Police officers must make
quick decisions, often in the face of great uncertainty. These decisions,
moreover, can have a great impact on victims, offenders, and third parties.
Police decisions can prevent—or cause—injury or death, they can lead to
rightful convictions, or to wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions.
Not surprisingly, the police are required to follow a set of procedural rules.
Given the large number of potential contexts in which these criminal
procedure rules may apply, they have evolved into a set of complicated,
often vague, prohibitions and directives. Police officers must often apply
these rules on the fly, under time pressure, knowing that procedural
mistakes can make it more difficult to effectively prosecute offenders and
prevent wrongful convictions.
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3. Ongoing Interactions and Coordination
The level of complexity is also affected by the way that these various
actors interact after the crime is committed. Eyewitnesses and crime-scene
investigators both interact with offenders, although at different times and
through different modes of communication. Between the time that a
witness observes a crime and her testimony, she will have occasion to
interact with investigators and prosecutors. Complexity will increase with
the number of these interactions. It will also increase to the extent that the
nature of these interactions is not sufficiently transparent to third parties.
Complexity will also tend to increase when parties are required to
coordinate with each other.36 Coordination failures, even if temporary, can
be costly. Coordination will become more difficult to the extent that actors
have incomplete information about each other and their environment. The
problem is further exacerbated if their behavior is guided by complex legal
rules—for example, the complex set of rules that officers must follow in
deciding whether they need a search warrant or whether they can make an
arrest.37
Law enforcement, by necessity, requires multiple state actors to
coordinate their behavior: legislators decide what conduct to outlaw; the
police monitors, prevents, and investigates; prosecutors have broad
discretion in deciding whether to bring a case; and judges make procedural
rulings and pass sentences.38 To fully coordinate, each of these law
enforcement actors must try to predict how other enforcement personnel
are going to act. They also need to assure that their behavior over time
intersects39 along a number of dimensions—not just physically and
temporally but also at the epistemic level.40

36
See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 8–10 (1969) (discussing general
coordination problem).
37
See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 34 (1988) (describing the complexity of the Fourth Amendment and failure of
cases to provide clear guidance to police).
38
See JEAN HINDRIKS & GARETH D. MYLES, INTERMEDIATE PUBLIC ECONOMICS 585 (2d ed.
2013) (describing difficulty of making broad claims about an enforcement effort decision when
enforcement is dispersed across various actors).
39
Coordination complexity will increase to the extent that parties are required to coordinate their
behavior over time. See George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON.
PERSP. 181, 181 (1989) (defining intertemporal choices as “decisions in which the timing of costs and
benefits are spread out over time”).
40
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 31–33 (1975) (discussing “information impactedness”—i.e., “when true underlying
circumstances relevant to the transaction . . . are known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly
discerned by or displayed for others”).
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4. Discretion and Complexity
The greater the discretion41 of the police, prosecutors, and judges,
regarding enforcement activities and gross sanctions, the greater the
amount of complexity faced by each of these actors, as well as potential
offenders. For example, prosecutors have great discretion at the time of
charging. They may choose to charge an offender with a single count or
break down the offense into multiple counts, depending on the context.
Prosecutors also have discretion in agreeing to a plea deal and a reduced
sanction under such an agreement.42
D. Accurate Policing
Police officers make law enforcement decisions using information
about the “crime environment” in which potential offenders and victims
interact.43 Before making an enforcement decision, an officer will
determine the extent to which it makes sense to acquire information to
reduce uncertainty about the crime environment.44 Acquiring and using
information, however, is costly.45 Rational police officers will economize,
investing in information only up to the point that a $1 investment produces
41

Discretion is a difficult concept to define precisely, but at a minimum involves a person’s
ability or freedom to choose between two or more possible actions. For example, prosecutors may
exercise discretion when deciding whether or not to charge a suspect, and judges, when sentencing
defendants, although, in both cases, their discretion is subject to a number of procedural and legal
constraints. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law
Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 89–91 (1984)
(defining discretion generally and applying definition to the context of police discretion).
42
David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 498 (2016) (stating that growing complexity of criminal justice system helps
explain rise of prosecutorial power).
43
A decision environment includes everything that is relevant to the decision, including other
actors, tangible objects, and intangible “things.” See JON BARWISE, THE SITUATION IN LOGIC xiv
(1989) (developing “situation logic” in which actors find themselves within a context or situation—i.e.,
“portions of reality”—at a specific point in time). Rational actors attach subjective probability
assessments about their environment based on the beliefs they hold about it. They will, over time,
update their beliefs, to the extent that they determine that they do not conform to the true state of the
world. See Radu J. Bogdan, The Manufacture of Belief, in BELIEF: FORM, CONTENT AND FUNCTION
149, 160–61 (Badu J. Bogdan ed. 1986) (stating that beliefs “track” certain facts or information about
the real world); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 67–69 (1993) (discussing various
reasons for privileging true beliefs, but stating that in some rare contexts having false beliefs can make
someone better off).
44
See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
INFORMATION § 5.1–5.2 (1992) (discussing cost-benefit analysis used by decision-makers
contemplating acquiring information to reduce uncertainty).
45
See LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 23–24 (1988) (discussing
costs of time spent by individuals searching for information); Herbert A. Simon, Alternative Visions of
Rationality, in RATIONALITY IN ACTION: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 189, 197–200 (Paul K. Moser
ed., 1990) (describing costs associated with processing information and role of bounded rationality in
decision-making process).
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at least a $1 benefit, such as learning of a crime’s occurrence or an
offender’s identity.
Officers may also invest in making more accurate enforcement
decisions, investments in information that can reduce the likelihood of
wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals.46 As a general matter, a
“fully accurate” decision is one the decision-maker would not change if
she had additional information.47 One would expect that rational police
officers intent on making good law enforcement decisions will invest in
increasing the accuracy of their observations up to the point that the
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of added accuracy.48 Police
officers, however, are agents of the state.49 As such, their interests may
diverge from those of a benevolent lawmaker who sets out to maximize
social welfare.50
46
These potential errors can be reduced by acquiring more accurate information. An observation
is more “accurate” if it leads to a conclusion that is closer to the true state of the environment. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J. L. & ECON. 1, 10–12
(1994) (stating that the greater the accuracy of information, the less likely that there will be an
adjudication error).
47
See John W. Payne & James R. Bettman, Preferential Choice and Adaptive Strategy Use, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 123, 133–34 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds.,
2001) (discussing various metrics used in the rationality literature to assess the “accuracy” of
decisions).
48
In designing a law enforcement system, it is necessary to take into account the tradeoff between
the accuracy and usability of information gathered in the process. For example, in a nuclear power
plant, it is important to get an accurate reading of the temperature inside the reactor’s core; at the same
time, greater accuracy will require more data and thus more computational resources and processing
time. What ultimately matters is getting an accurate reading in a timely fashion. One way that designers
have dealt with this type of problem is by taking measurements at set intervals, and if those
measurements indicate that there is a potential problem, dynamically taking more extensive, “accurate”
measurements. During the time that the more detailed measurements are being made and processed, the
plant’s operator may determine, given other threshold signals, that the reactor has to be shut down
immediately—i.e., before getting a full, accurate reading. For a discussion of the multiple-tier safety
procedures, see John A. Stankovic, Real-Time and Embedded Systems, in THE COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 1710–11 (Allen B. Tucker, Jr. ed., 1997) (reviewing the concepts of
sensors, time correctness, timing constraints, and critical tasks in the context of real-time systems using
examples of safety procedures for nuclear reactors, aircraft control, and automated factory floors).
49
Agency relationships arise when one party agrees to act on behalf of another party. The
Restatement of Agency defines agency as “the fiduciary relationship . . . arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's
behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
50
Agency relationships allow a principal to delegate certain tasks to the agent. This is beneficial,
since it allows for the division of labor. It, however, comes at a cost. As a general matter, a principal
will be unable to fully monitor their agent. One would expect that a bona fide, self-interested agent will
act in a self-serving manner, at least to the extent to which the principal cannot observe its behavior.
See John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 2 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(stating that an agency problem can arise when “one individual depends on the action[s or behavior] of
another”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION,
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Even if police officers were perfectly benevolent and wanted to choose
the optimal level of accuracy, they may fail to do so. This is because more
accurate decisions demand more information and thus lead to more
complexity.51 Given the bounded rationality of officers, it would not make
economic sense to acquire additional information that will go unused. As a
result, officers will underinvest in increasing the accuracy of their
information—unless they can do so in a manner that does not increase their
overall cognitive load. One way of doing this is by using surveillance
technology that combines and presents data in a manner that reduces
complexity.
E. The Timing of Enforcement: Ex Ante Preventive Policing vs. Ex Post
Investigative Policing
Society can choose to focus its enforcement efforts to interrupt crimes
before they occur (“preventive policing”),52 or to investigate crimes after
they have occurred (“investigative policing”).53 In preventive policing
INFORMATION AND MARKETS 241, 241–42 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1989) (discussing the sources of
agency problems and various approaches available to try to reduce agency costs).
51
A perfectly accurate set of observations would lead to a transparent environment. Transparency
refers to a decision-maker’s level of access to information about her environment. An environment is
transparent in real-time if the decision-maker comes to hold true beliefs about the relevant properties
while she still has the ability to change her mind about a planned course of action. An environment is
completely opaque if the decision-maker does not hold any true beliefs about any of its relevant
properties at the time of acting. Real-time transparency and opaqueness lie in a continuum: at one end
is complete real-time transparency, in which a decision-maker has access in real time to all of the
information that she needs to make a fully informed decision; at the other end of the spectrum is
complete opacity, in which the actor makes the decision completely blind—i.e., without access to any
relevant information. More generally, a decision-maker starts with a goal, a set of beliefs, and a set of
feasible actions that can help her achieve that goal. Among other things, she holds beliefs about certain
aspects or properties of her environment, including its current state and way it may evolve. Suppose
that the true state of the environment (or its expected state in the future) is defined by a set of properties
(x, y, z, etc.); that environment is transparent if the decision-maker believes that all of these properties
are true. The level of transparency will go down to the extent that the observer is mistaken about one or
more of them. See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 46 (1995) (drawing distinction between accessible environments, in which an agent is able
to ascertain the true state of an environment by observing it, and non-accessible ones, in which
observation provides only partial information of an environment’s true state).
52
See State v. Slater, 2010 WL 5419030, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (describing
preventive policing in which police tries to prevent crimes from occurring); DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD
COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 4 (2005) (defining preventive policing as an approach in
which police focus on preventing crime before it occurs as opposed to investigating crimes after the
fact); Amna Akbar, National Security's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 849 (2015)
(describing preventive policing approach in national security context); Elizabeth E. Joh, The New
Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 15,
25–26 (2016) (describing Chicago preventive policing program).
53
See Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate
Investigative Sphere,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 617, 620 n.18 (2006) (drawing distinction between preventive
and investigative policing, and defining latter as law enforcement activities aimed at “seeking out
criminal activity or responding to crime” which includes “walking the beat or patrolling in a car to
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regimes, the timing of enforcement actions matters much more: the police
need to be constantly on guard to try to identify potential offenders and the
date, time, and location when a crime may occur. In other words, police
officers must not only make the right decision regarding whether a crime is
occurring or is about to occur, but they must make that decision at the right
time.54 Preventive policing also requires the authorities to invest in
enforcement-related information that may go stale before they get a chance
to use it.55
In investigative policing regimes, on the other hand, the authorities can
wait to start expending resources on enforcement until they know that a
crime has occurred, at a particular location. At that point, they can focus
fully on identifying and locating the offender. Importantly, in an
investigative regime, law enforcement can wait until some of the
uncertainty surrounding a crime has been resolved before they commit
resources to enforcement.56
All other things being equal, investigative policing involves a smaller
number of dimensions: there will be less uncertainty about the set of
potential offenders, victims, types of crimes, and geographical locations.57
Furthermore, the only material time constraint faced by investigators are
statutes of limitations.58 It follows, that preventive policing is a more
complex undertaking. Given this complexity, the bounded rationality
constraints faced by police officers will be more binding in preventive
setting up speed traps, [and] responding to 911 calls”); Dilip Mookherjee & I. P. L. Png, Monitoring
Vis-á-Vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 556, 556 (1992) (distinguishing
between ex ante monitoring and ex post investigations).
54
See Stankovic, supra note 49, at 1709 (stating that a real-time system is one in which the
correctness of the system depends on both the result and the time in which the result is produced).
55
See Stuart Anderson & Juliana Küster Filipe, Guaranteeing Temporal Validity with a RealTime Logic of Knowledge, in IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYSTEMS 178, 178 (2003) (“The older the data gets the
more unusable and unreliable it becomes.”); Ben Kao et al., Updates and View Maintenance in Soft
Real-Time Database Systems, 8 INT’L CONF. INFO. & KNOWLEDGE MGMT. 300, 300–01 (1999)
(discussing the problems that can arise when using stale data).
56
Investments in information are irreversible, so the greater the uncertainty regarding the future,
the greater the potential value of delaying making an investment until some of that uncertainty is
resolved. See AVINASH DIXIT & ROBERT PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3–4 (1994)
(discussing the “option” value created by delaying making decisions that are costly to reverse, where a
decision-maker has the ability to delay committing to a course of action, and some of the uncertainty
will be resolved with the passage of time); see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 690 (1995) (discussing role of passage of time in revealing true states of world and resolving
uncertainty).
57
All other things being equal, the complexity of a decision will increase with the number of
future states of the world affected by that decision. See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 97–100 (2000) (arguing
that complexity increases with uncertainty or equivalently with the number of future states of the world
that a decision-maker must take into account).
58
If it takes too long to solve the crime, other time constraints will become binding. For example,
witnesses may die or their testimony become less accurate as they begin to forget certain facts.
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regimes.
Under the economics approach to criminal law, society should focus
on investigative, not preventive policing. Preventive policing will
sometimes lead to pre-crime investigations and arrests of individuals who,
if left to their own devices, would have decided not to go through with the
crime in question. Preventing offenders from committing crimes imposes
costs on the offenders who are prevented from committing the crime. An
offender who is caught in a crime prevention scheme will bear additional
costs, including the myriad tangible and intangible costs associated with
being stopped, searched, and arrested.
F. Inattentive Policing
A number of studies have found that inattention can lead decisionmakers to make systematic decision mistakes. Consumers are less likely to
pay attention to hidden taxes, hidden shipping costs, and financial
information revealed on Fridays.59 All things being equal, inattentive
decision-makers are more likely to pay attention to salient information, and
overlook less salient, complex information. This is because when decisionmakers face bounded rationality constraints, they must decide which pieces
of information to include in their deliberations and which to ignore. A fully
rational actor will use both salient and non-salient information, but
inattentive, boundedly rational actors will give relatively more attention to
salient information. Inattention, therefore, is more likely to lead to
erroneous decisions when decision-makers must make decisions quickly.
Inattention can lead police officers to make mistakes when confronting
offenders or investigating crimes.60 As with bounded rationality, the
likelihood of such a mistake increases as the complexity of the crime
59
See Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145,
1165 (finding that consumers are less likely to pay attention to hidden taxes); Tanjim Hossain & John
Morgan, . . . Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, 6
B.E.J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y: ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2006) (finding that to
the extent that those charges are bundled with the price of the item being sold, purchasers in eBay
auctions are less likely to incorporate the shipping charges into their decision process, as opposed to
being presented as an independent cost); David Hirshleifer et al., Driven to Distraction: Extraneous
Events and Underreaction to Earnings News, 64 J. FIN. 2289, 2323 (finding greater inattention when
too much information about different companies is released on the same day); Lauren Cohen & Andrea
Frazzini, Economic Links and Predictable Returns, 63 J. FIN. 1977, 1978–79 (2008) (finding slow
reaction by investors in company A of incorporating information from company B that has an indirect
effect on the future value of company A).
60
Let v be the benefit to a police officer from taking an enforcement action and let c be the costs.
A rational officer will take that action only if: v – c > 0. One way of modeling inattention, and parsing
out its various components is by introducing an additional parameter, θ, that captures the officer’s level
of inattention. Let o be information about the action in question that is opaque. The officer would then
make a decision based on the following cost-benefit calculus: [v + (1 – θ) × ov] – [c + (1 – θ) × oc] >
0. This means that if, θ = 1, the officer is fully inattentive; and if θ = 0, he is fully attentive.
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environment increases, and whenever officers must make decisions
quickly. Preventive policing requires officers to make a larger number of
quick decisions than does investigative policing. Moreover, the costs
associated with preventive policing mistakes tend to be higher—e.g.,
wrongfully arresting someone or inappropriately resorting to the use of
deadly force.
G. Preventive Policing and Machine Learning
Police departments that have embraced preventive policing make great
use of machine learning algorithms to help identify crime hot spots and
deploy enforcement personnel. It is thus helpful to provide a brief
overview of how machine learning works. Machine learning algorithms
process data in order to identify patterns and make predictions.61 Under the
most common type of machine learning, supervised learning, historical
data is used to train the learning algorithm to identify a set of descriptive
features and a target feature, and settle on a prediction model that is
consistent with the training data. A model is consistent if it makes a correct
prediction for every record in the training dataset.62
The goal of machine learning is to use training data to find predictive
models that generalize well, so that they can be used to make accurate
predictions when new data is used.63 Two types of generalization problems
can arise. In the first, the “overfitting” problem, the person using the
algorithm fits the training data so well that the predictive model,
understandably, makes very accurate predictions using that training data.64
On the other hand, a predictive model suffers from “underfitting” when the
model is not complex or expressive enough to capture the underlying
relationship between the descriptive features and the target feature.65
For example, in credit-default machine learning programs, the
descriptive features may include the borrower’s age, occupation, income,
and credit history, and the target feature would be a “yes” or “no” answer

61
See JOHN D. KELLEHER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MACHINE LEARNING FOR PREDICTIVE
DATA ANALYTICS 3 (2015) (defining machine learning as “an automated process that extracts patterns
from data”).
62
See KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 62, at 4–6 (describing models that are consistent with data
and some of the problems with relying solely on consistency when judging models).
63
Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55 COMM. OF THE
ACM (2012) (“The fundamental goal of machine learning is to generalize beyond the examples in the
training set.”).
64
See Vineet Chaoji et al., Machine Learning in the Real World, 9 PROCEEDINGS VLDB
ENDOWMENT 1597, 1598 (2016) (describing “overfitting” problem in which a predictive model fits the
training data well but fails to properly generalize to new data).
65
See id. (describing underfitting problem, where the model is not expressive enough to capture
the underlying relationship).
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66

to the question: did the borrower default? Historical training data is used
to come up with a generalizable prediction model. One possibility is the
model: if the borrower is under the age of 30, is an industrial worker,
makes under $50,000, and has a credit rating of under 700, then the
borrower defaults.
Preventive policing using machine learning casts a wide net. Its goal is
to gather large amounts of data in order to learn about the crime
environments in which potential offenders operate.67 Historical data about
past crimes, geographical locations, and other predictive features are used
to train the algorithms. As new data is fed into the trained algorithms, the
programs will make predictions about geographical areas in which
particular types of crimes are likely to occur within set time periods.68 This
allows police departments to deploy personnel in anticipation.69 There are
well known problems with predictive policing learning algorithms,
including certain biases that can creep into the algorithms over time.
In addition to machine learning, digital policing uses other Big Data
technologies to collect and mine surveillance data to help reduce the
bounded rationality constraints70 faced by law enforcement personnel.
Even though digital policing systems greatly increase the amount of
information available to officers, they do so using well-designed
interfaces71 that “hide” irrelevant information72 from police officers
66
See Amir E. Khandani et al., Consumer Credit-Risk Models Via Machine-Learning Algorithms,
34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2767, 2772–73 (2010) (discussing descriptive features in credit card default
model).
67
See Lawrence W. Sherman, Patrick R. Gartin, & Michael E. Buerger, Hot Spots of Predatory
Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 37–42 (1989) (early
study finding crime “hotspots” and providing explanation for observed geographic concentrations);
George Mohler, Marked Point Process Hotspot Maps for Homicide and Gun Crime Prediction in
Chicago, 30 INT’L J. FORECASTING 491, 495 (2014) (describing hotspot policing and predictive
policing methods, which rank geographic locations based on historical data and the estimated risk of
future crimes, in order to allocate scarce police resources).
68
See Lawrence McClendon & Natarajan Meghanathan, Using Machine Learning Algorithms to
Analyze Crime Data, 2 MACHINE LEARNING & APPLICATIONS: AN INT’L J. 1, 2 (2015) (noting the goal
of data mining and machine learning algorithms is to predict future outcomes).
69
See Chao Zhang et al., Keeping Pace with Criminals: Designing Patrol Allocation Against
Adaptive Opportunistic Criminals, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 1351, 1357–58 (2015) (describing learning results
from planning algorithms for anticipating opportunistic criminal offenders).
70
This is not to say that digital policing systems do not face similar time and computational
constraints. The difference is that people have more limited computational power than do machines;
they also have more limited storage capability. See, e.g., RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 52, at 845–46
(discussing challenge of bounded rationality for artificial intelligence).
71
An “interface” is a set of rules that governs the manner in which an observer can extract
information from her environment: on one side of the interface resides the information which will
remain hidden from observers; on the other, the information that the designer makes available to any
observer who interacts with that environment through that interface. Because of this informationfiltering characteristic, interfaces are an important mechanism for hiding information. See Jakob
Nielsen, Usability Engineering, in THE COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 1440,
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through abstraction and modular design. This helps reduce the overall
complexity of processing and using that information.75
Digital policing systems can evaluate information in real-time, or
merely capture it to store and process at later times. Processing information
on an as-needed basis is useful in reducing complexity and computational
costs,76 and avoiding wasteful processing of information that is never used.
This sort of “lazy evaluation” of data creates an option value similar to a

1440–41 (Allen B. Tucker, Jr. ed., 1997) (describing branch of computer science that deals with the
problem of reducing the complexity that humans experience when they interact with computers).
72
Since the cognitive load of interacting with a system increases with the number of components,
it follows one can reduce complexity by “hiding” components from users. See STEVE MCCONNELL,
CODE COMPLETE 118 (1993) (stating, in the context of software engineering, that information hiding is
“one of the few theoretical techniques that has indisputably proven its value in practice”); Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Optimization, Constraint, and History in the Evolution of Eyes, 65 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 281,
282–84 (1990) (describing end result of several evolutionary processes by which eyes have adapted to,
among other things, abstract away from superfluous information); Herbert A. Simon, The Organization
of Complex Systems, in MODELS OF DISCOVERY 245, 254 (1977) (stating that in hierarchical systems
one can reduce complexity by having the system components operate “in independence of the detail of
the others; only the inputs it requires and the output it produces are relevant for the larger aspects of
system behavior”).
73
See HAROLD ABELSON & GERALD JAY SUSSMAN, STRUCTURE AND INTERPRETATION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS 80–82 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the use of data abstraction in computer
programs in order to clearly separate the way that data objects are implemented—the manner in which
data is represented and stored in the computer’s memory—from the way that they are used by
procedures that manipulate them); CALEB DRAKE, OBJECT ORIENTED PROGRAMMING WITH C++ AND
SMALLTALK 98 (1998) (stating that abstraction is “the process of extracting the relevant information
about a category, entity, or activity, and ignoring the inessential details”); ROBERT CECIL MARTIN,
DESIGNING OBJECT-ORIENTED C++ APPLICATIONS: USING THE BOOCH METHOD 9 (1995) (stating that
abstraction involves the “elimination of the irrelevant and the amplification of the essential”).
74
Modular design “glues” together the various components of a complex system in order to (1)
reduce the cognitive load faced by both designers and users; (2) make it easier to modify the system by
reducing the number of interdependencies among its components; and (3) create “standardized
modules” that can be reused when creating new systems with similar functionality. See ABELSON &
SUSSMAN, supra note 74, at 359 (stating that computer programmers control complexity using same
type of modularity techniques used by engineers at large, in which the system is stratified along
different levels of abstraction, “each one adopting appropriate large-scale views of system structure”);
Simon, supra note 73, at 254 (stating that loose coupling of system components allows each component
to operate independently of others by localizing all interactions on inputs and outputs carried out
through the interface of each component).
75
See Woodrow Hartzog et. al, Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1763, 1768–73 (summarizing developments in law enforcement technologies that have automated
parts of traditional policing).
76
It is not necessary for the whole information bundle to be completely processed before an actor
can undertake other processing tasks. The only requirement is that the actor can eventually reconstitute
the knowledge gained from processing each chunk. For example, operating systems are designed so
that they can interrupt an ongoing process to take on a new one with higher priority, and to be able to
return to the interrupted process in some future period to continue its execution. See Thomas E.
Anderson et al., Thread Management for Shared-Memory Multiprocessors, in THE COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 1165, 1670–72 (Allen B. Tucker, Jr. ed., 1997) (describing processor
scheduling issues in operating systems).
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financial option. Eager surveillance, on the other hand, involves proactive
surveillance in order to stop potential offenders before they are able to
commit a crime.78 Information gathered for eager surveillance purposes can
be used after the fact for lazy evaluation.
H. The Social Welfare Effects of Digital Policing
1. Social Benefits
There are a number of social benefits produced by digital policing.
Digital policing can also reduce the costs of ex ante law enforcement. It
creates economies of scale that allow for a greater amount of enforcement
activities per dollar spent. It reduces complexity and bounded rationality
constraints, thereby allowing officers to make more informed decisions.79
One consequence is that digital policing will generally require offenders to
expend more resources to plan, execute, and cover-up their crimes. This
can lead to increased deterrence of some offenders.
Digital policing can also reduce the loss borne by crime victims to the
extent that it increases deterrence or leads to an increase in the number of
crimes interrupted by the police before the offender can complete them. 80
Potential victims can reduce their own investments in crime prevention.81
They can either rely on the increased public preventive enforcement, or
purchase off-the-rack surveillance cameras and other devices, which have
become more cost effective in part due to the growing demand for these
technologies by law enforcement.
Finally, digital policing can reduce the number of wrongful
convictions and wrongful acquittals. For example, it can lead the
authorities to rely less on eyewitness testimony, which is more prone to
77
Lazy evaluation is in some pure functional programming languages, such as Haskell, that make
great use of recursive functions that require a lot of computational power. The basic idea is to evaluate
functions only when it is clear that the program needs the information to continue to execute properly.
A program that uses lazy evaluation can process infinite lists in finite time, given that such lists would
not be evaluated until they are needed (and only those portions that are relevant to the task at hand).
Lazy evaluation, therefore, allows programmers to create the illusion that a list of objects is infinite
when in fact it is not. See RICHARD BIRD, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMMING USING
HASKELL 217–221 (2d ed. 1998) (describing how lazy evaluations helps reduce two types of
complexity problems in computer programs: those brought about by the limited storage space within
computers and the limited time to execute programs).
78
See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the Fourth
Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 562 (2013) (stating that “wiretaps on telephones and
Terry stops are [describing] proactive surveillance techniques whose aim is to “identify potential
criminals before they have committed a more severe crime,” including wiretaps and Terry stops).
79
But see Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101
MINN. L. REV. 541, 542–44 (2016) (describing systematic errors in databases used by police).
80
Anthony A. Braga, Better Policing Can Improve Legitimacy and Reduce Mass Incarceration,
29 HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 238–39 (2016).
81
Id.
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82

erroneous identifications.
2. Social Costs

There are social costs associated with digital policing. Digital policing
creates a number of well-known Fourth Amendment concerns.83 Digital
policing can also increase the potential privacy intrusions borne by
innocent, law-abiding citizens. These privacy intrusions can have the
perverse effect of leading some otherwise law-abiding individuals to
violate the law. To see this, assume that in an investigative policing
scheme innocent third parties bear no externality costs. Assume further that
if someone obeys the law and suffers a privacy intrusion, they would value
the disutility of that intrusion at a cost of $100. Offenders, on the other
hand, are more likely to have taken counter-surveillance measures, as part
of their effort to avoid being detected. Assume, therefore, that an
offender’s privacy disutility from this added surveillance is $0. Adding
$100 to the costs of obeying the law will reduce the net benefits from
obedience. As a result, all other things being equal, it will increase the
incentive of otherwise law-abiding individuals to violate the law.
Additionally, as shown in Section III, digital policing can lead to
systematic, inefficient overdeterrence. It can also lead to “technology
wars” between law enforcement and offenders. Expenditures in
surveillance can, in short, lead to expenditures in counter-surveillance,
which can in turn lead to a ratcheting-up of surveillance expenditures, and
so on.
One would also expect that as police departments become more
dependent on digital policing, they will have an incentive to focus their
attention on monitoring populations whose activities can be digitally
observed and measured. One would also expect that they will increasingly
use digital policing to surveil individuals residing in localities in which
direct law enforcement is costlier to carry out, is more dangerous, or is
subject to a greater potential for police mistakes. Digital policing using
predictive policing machine learning software can create an additional
social cost: it can lead the police to inappropriately focus on detecting
crimes committed by certain populations and in certain localities.
Finally, one would expect that as the cost of digital policing goes
down, the likelihood of grossly negligent uses of deadly force due to poor
training will increase. With the increased use of digital surveillance, police
officers spend less time engaged in traditional forms of monitoring and
82

But see infra Section III.E. (discussing specific contexts in which digital policing can increase
potential errors).
83
See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 80, at 548, 577–83 (discussing Fourth Amendment concerns
in the realm of examining “significant legal and practical barriers that stand in the way of detecting,
curing, and remedying data error”).
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surveillance that can help them “learn-by-doing.” The tacit knowledge
gained through direct experience can put officers in a better position to
make split-second judgments about whether it is appropriate to use deadly
force, about whether a crime has been committed, about the seriousness of
the crime, and about the identity of the offender. These last three types of
mistakes played a role in a number of the recent controversial uses of
deadly force.
III. DIGITAL POLICING AND DETERRENCE POLICY
Digital policing, as we have seen, helps reduce the overall complexity
of law enforcement. By doing so, it allows authorities to shift their focus
from investigative policing to preventive policing, which is a much more
complex undertaking. This Section examines the extent to which the
increased use of digital policing, and the related expansion of preventive
policing regimes, can affect deterrence policy.
This Section first shows that digital policing can lead to inefficient
overdeterrence. It then describes an offender’s transaction costs—
investments in planning, executing, and covering up crimes—and analyzes
their effect on deterrence policy. The Section then examines the
relationship between digital policing and wrongful acquittals and
convictions. The Section concludes by examining digital policing’s effects
on marginal deterrence.
A. Overdeterrence in Specific and General Enforcement Regimes
Recall that under optimal deterrence, a lawmaker will first determine
the expected harm from a particular crime, and it will then set the expected
sanctions equal to the expected harm. Under such a regime, offenders will
decide to commit a crime only when they receive an expected benefit
greater than the expected harm they impose on victims. The expected
sanctions in turn depend on two factors: the gross sanctions and the
probability of detection. In order to increase the probability of detection, a
lawmaker will have to invest in law enforcement.
1. Specific Enforcement Regimes
Under the standard economic approach, a lawmaker should use a
specific enforcement regime. Under specific enforcement, the lawmaker
treats each crime individually: for each, it decides how much to spend on
enforcement, and thus where to set the probability of detection.84 This
allows the lawmaker to create a better tailored enforcement regime, one
less likely to lead to inefficient overdeterrence or underdeterrence.
84
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 62 (stating that to achieve specific enforcement, a
lawmaker would choose the optimal probability of detection for each different type of crime).

2017]

DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND PREVENTIVE POLICING

1477

Due to economies of scale, digital policing allows society to increase
the probability of detection without having to incur additional enforcement
expenditures. If society leaves the gross sanctions at the same level that
they were before the advent of digital policing, then offenders subject to a
specific enforcement regime would be overdeterred.85 The overdeterrence
problem is exacerbated once we take into account how digital policing
affects general enforcement.
2. General Enforcement Regimes
In general enforcement, the lawmaker does not draw as fine a
distinction between crimes. Instead, they rely on enforcement mechanisms
that apply to multiple types of crime, mechanisms in which a single
enforcement act can detect different types of crimes.86 For example, a
police officer patrolling a beat may come across different crimes during
their patrol or a review of CCTV camera footage may reveal different
types of crimes.
The growing use of digital policing in law enforcement has had the
concomitant effect of shifting enforcement policy toward the generalenforcement end of the spectrum. A number of surveillance, big data, and
machine learning enforcement technologies developed to prevent terrorism
and other major crimes have produced an “enforcement externality”: they
can be used to detect and prevent other types of offenses, without having to
make significant additional enforcement investments.87 The latest iteration
of this move toward general enforcement is the growing use of predictive

85
For example, suppose that under a pre-digital policing regime, society spends $100 to produce a
probability of detection of q = 0.25. By using digital policing, society, with that same $100
enforcement investment, can increase the probability of detection to p = 0.5. Under the economics
approach, the optimal sanctions equal: ([the harm, h, created by the crime]/[probability of detection]) +
[enforcement expenditures]. Suppose that a crime creates a social harm of $10,000. Under a pre-digital
policing regime, the optimal sanctions are: [$10,000/0.25] + $100 = $40,100. Under digital policing,
the optimal sanctions are: [$10,000/0.5] + $100 = $20,100.
86
See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 62 (describing general enforcement as involving an
action by an enforcement authority that has the possibility of detecting more than one type of
violation). Suppose that an offense produces a harm, h, the probability of detection is p, and the optimal
sanction is h/p. A lawmaker who relies on specific enforcement will choose a crime-specific probability
of detection, p, which it will implement through its enforcement expenditures. For example, it may set
p at 0.1 for criminal trespass and at 0.3 for robbery. If the lawmaker chooses to implement a pure
general enforcement regime, it would, in theory, adopt a general detection mechanism in which all
crimes would have the same probability of being detected. In other words, p would be the same across
all crimes.
87
See Rosa Brooks, The Trickle-Down War, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 583, 590–91 (2014)
(discussing increased use of technology, such as drones, developed for military, and programs through
which the Defense Department donates unneeded equipment to police departments); Catherine Crump,
Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1659–60 (2016) (discussing
legislation passed to limit police surveillance and better regulate transfer of military equipment to
police departments, particularly in light of Ferguson).
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policing, carried out using off-the-shelf machine learning software.88
Predictive policing algorithms use historical crime data to give police
officers a greater sense of when and where potential crimes may occur.89
The turn toward digital policing has had the effect of bringing together,
within a general enforcement regime, crimes that had been previously
under a specific enforcement regime. But each crime class that is brought
under the general enforcement digital policing scheme will automatically
inherit a higher probability of detection.90 In order to keep the level of
deterrence at the same level, and thus avoid overdeterring offenders, the
gross sanctions for those crime classes must be reduced.91 As mentioned
above, however, we have not seen a concomitant reduction in gross
sanctions.
B. Overdeterrence of Serial Offenders
This section shows that digital policing will lead to even greater levels
of overdeterrence if the offender has committed previous crimes.
1. Serial Offenders
It is useful to draw a distinction between serial offenders and repeat
offenders. The former includes an offender who commits more than one
crime at different points in time,92 whether or not they are apprehended and
convicted. A repeat offender (or recidivist) is a serial offender who has
been previously convicted of a crime. Serial misconduct is a common
phenomenon. Many types of crimes afford offenders with repeated
88
See Ric Simmons, Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data
in Our Criminal Justice System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 954-57 (describing different predictive
policing software used by police departments); Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent
Crime
Before
It
Happens?,
SCI.
MAG.
(Sept.
28,
2016,
9:00
AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-it-happens.
89
Id.
90
All other things being equal, an increase in general enforcement should lead a lawmaker to
lower the gross sanctions for a crime.
91
For example, suppose that crimes C1, C2,…,Cn have the same probability of detection, p, and
that C1 creates harm h1, C2, creates harm h2, and so on. Finally, suppose that h1 > h2 >…> hn. Then it
follows that the gross sanction for crime C1 should be higher than that for crime C2, and so on. Suppose
that crime C1 creates a loss for the victim of $10,000 and crime C2 a loss of $5,000, and that the general
enforcement common probability of detection is p = 0.5. Then an offender who commits crime C1
should be fined $20,000, and one who commits crime C2 should be fined $10,000. Suppose now that a
crime D creates a harm h = $10,000 and, up to this point, it has been subject to a specific enforcement
scheme, with a probability of detection of q = 0.25. The optimal gross sanctions for this crime are
$40,000. Assume that the general enforcement strategy is expanded slightly so that crime D now falls
within it. Under general enforcement, the probability of detection doubles from q = 0.25 to p = 0.5. It
follows that in order to maintain the same level of deterrence, the gross sanctions must be reduced from
$40,000 to $20,000.
92
These crimes may be spaced out over a short spree or over years in the case of a career
criminal.
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opportunities to violate the law. Employees who embezzle funds often do
so repeatedly and over extended periods.93 Co-conspirators in criminal
enterprises and members of gangs engage in a variety of repeated criminal
activity over long periods of time. Managers who falsify financial results
usually do so in more than one reporting period and may over time resort
to other fraudulent transactions to cover up the false disclosure. More
generally, serial misconduct is common in securities, antitrust, and
environmental law, as well as in a number of other regulatory contexts.
2. Escalating Sanctions and Overdeterrence
Under the economics approach to criminal law, the optimal expected
sanctions are solely determined by the harm produced when an offender
violates the law, which (all other things being equal) will be the same
across offenders and regardless of the number of times the crime is
committed.94 That is, a rational offender will commit a crime ten times (or
equivalently, ten offenders will each commit it once) only if, in each
instance, the benefits are greater than the expected sanctions (and thus
greater than the harm produced).
Since, for the purpose of setting optimal sanctions, all instances of the
same crime are identical, the standard approach does not draw a distinction
between the one-time and serial offender. The law, however, routinely
punishes previously convicted offenders and those who commit more than
one crime before being caught (whether or not previously convicted) with
“super-punitive” expected sanctions.95 Serial offenders face sanctions that
93

Greg Jones, Good Workers Gone Bad: How to Spot Employee Theft, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2012,
11:54 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46556452.
94
See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of
Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2005) (stating that the standard law and economics
approach to repeated misconduct has “long assumed that whether such choices are made repeatedly or
on a one-time basis is expected to have little or no effect on individuals’ decisions . . . .”).
95
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides for heightened sanctions for repeat and
career offenders. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2006) (allowing for the addition of points to criminal history dependent
upon the type and length of prior sentence); id. at § 4B1.1 (2006) (adjusting the offense level for career
offenders). Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, the range of penalties for a first-time
offender are $250 to $2,000; for a second-time offender they are $2,000 to $5,000; and for a third-time
offender they increase to $3,000 to $10,000. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101, 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2000). In addition, a person who engages in a pattern of violation of the Act
can also be subject to a six-month jail sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1). Environmental statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, also have provisions for escalating criminal
penalties for repeat offenders. Under the Clean Water Act, the available penalties are doubled after a
first conviction. See Water Quality Act of 1987 § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)–(2) (2000) (stating that
negligent violators face a maximum of $25,000 per day and a one-year jail sentence, knowing violators
face maximum of $50,000 per day and three-year jail sentence for first conviction and providing that
the sanctions for second offenses in each can be doubled); see also Clean Air Act § 701, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(1) (2000) (allowing maximum sanctions for second offense to be double those for first
offenses).
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are greater than the aggregate expected harm created by repeatedly
engaging in prohibited activity96 or delaying compliance with legallyimposed duties.97 Proponents of the economics approach to criminal law
acknowledge that increasing sanctions for serial offenders can lead to
overdeterrence98 for which they have offered various explanations.99
Nonetheless, the use of escalating sanctions for serial offenders remains a
puzzle. The move towards digital policing will only make this
overdeterrence puzzle more difficult to explain.
Digital policing has made it easier for the authorities to record for
future use the digital evidentiary trace created by a serial offender each
time that she commits a crime. If an offender is caught, her past decisions
to obey or disobey the law can affect how others frame and judge her
current act of misconduct—her state of mind, intent, and knowledge100—
and parcel reactive sentiments of resentment or indignation.101 The
increased use of digital policing has magnified an offender’s expected
future costs if she were caught and convicted. The digital trace from a
previous conviction will increase the likelihood of detection in future
96
See, e.g., United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming sentence enhancement for defendant’s violation of Clean Water Act for repeatedly washing
asbestos down drain that discharged into bay); United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544, 549–51 (2d Cir.
1994), overruled by United States v. Contreras, 593 F.3d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (agreeing that a
sentence can be enhanced for “ongoing and repetitive discharge” of a hazardous substance).
97
See, e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987 § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2012) (stating that each
one-day delay in complying with the agency’s order is an act of misconduct, triggering daily fines
between $5,000 and $50,000, regardless of the connection between the ongoing delay and the harm
caused by the violation being remedied).
98
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence,
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 307 (1998) (admitting that escalating sanctions may overdeter some
criminal behavior). A similar argument holds for the use of punitive damages in tort. See Punitive
Damages, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 193 (Peter
Newman ed., Macmillan Ref. Ltd. 1998) (“[I]f damages are less than harm, levels of activity will tend
to be socially excessive, and if damages exceed harm, levels of activity will tend to be low.”).
99
See C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 127, 130–31 (2000) (arguing that because the risk of an erroneous conviction is greater for a first
conviction, the penalty for a first conviction is set lower than the expected harm); POSNER, supra note
15 at 228–29 (noting several reasons why higher sanctions make sense, including to offset the reduced
stigma effect from a second conviction and to counteract the learning-by-doing of repeat offenders);
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 99, at 308–09 (arguing that punishing repeat offenders more severely
increases the level of deterrence because a first-time offender will take into account the expected
sanctions for both the first and second offense).
100
See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 147 (2003) (arguing that lawyers should anticipate hindsight bias when
advising clients acting at the margin of legality); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 590–94 (1998) (discussing the role of the hindsight
bias in ex post reconstructions of past behavior).
101
See R. Jay Wallace, Reason and Responsibility, in NORMATIVITY AND THE WILL: SELECTED
PAPERS ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PRACTICAL REASON 123, 123–24 (2006) (describing
expectations of behavior in moral communities as reactive sentiments and judgments).
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crimes. That is, in a world of increased surveillance, a previous arrest
will provide information to the police about the offender’s identity, which
will in turn reduce future enforcement costs vis-à-vis that offender. It
follows, that as the level of post-parole surveillance increases, the
sanctions imposed for future offenses should decrease.
C. Some Possible Reasons Why Gross Sanctions Have Not Been Reduced
1. Overcoming Systematic Underdeterrence
One possible explanation is that lawmakers believe that existing
sanctions are systematically underdeterring offenders,103 and thus should
be ratcheted up.104 This may explain why society seems to spend more on
enforcement than the economics approach predicts.105 Offenders who are
wealth-constrained and thus “judgment-proof” would be underdeterred by
fines but not by prison sentences.106 The perception by lawmakers that
some offenders are not just judgment-proof but also “prison-proof” is what
has led states to adopt three-strikes laws.107
The emergence of three-strikes laws is not the only indication that
102
See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110
YALE L.J. 733, 742 (2001) (arguing that the probability of detection increases with prior convictions
because convicted offenders leave a record in the system; therefore, optimal sanctions should be lower
for previously convicted offenders).
103
A number of criminal law scholars have persuasively argued that in practice, this approach has
led to repeated increases of criminal sanctions without achieving the deterrence lawmakers desired.
See, e.g., John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the
Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189, 193–95 (2005) (describing the problem of
underdeterrence notwithstanding ever-increasing prison sentences).
104
There are two reasons why policymakers may intentionally adopt sanctions that underdeter
offenders. The first reason is that risk averse offenders will be overdeterred by the optimal sanctions for
risk neutral offenders. Risk averse offenders would prefer lower actual sanctions and a higher
probability of being caught, given that if they are caught, the extra disutility to them from the higher
sanctions is a deadweight loss. For example, if the actual fine is $100,000, a risk averse person who is
caught will perceive a loss greater than $100,000, but society will only get the $100,000 fine. As a
result, policymakers who believe that the population is comprised of more risk averse than risk neutral
individuals will adopt lower sanctions. Second, policymakers may want to adopt expected sanctions
that are slightly lower than the expected harm, up to the point that the savings in enforcement costs are
greater than the marginal harm that is not deterred. See SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 484–85 (illustrating
the relationship between a low probability and high magnitude sanction policy).
105
See Garoupa, supra note 20, at 271 (stating that policymakers resort to prison sentences before
exhausting fines); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 16, at 51 (arguing that fines should be exhausted
before resorting to prison sentences because fines are socially costless).
106
SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 495 (noting that an actor whose benefit exceeds the maximum
imprisonment time will not be deterred).
107
The Supreme Court recognized as much when it refused to strike down California’s threestrikes law in Ewing v. California, explaining that California’s legislature made a “deliberate policy
choice that individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent criminal behavior, and whose
conduct has not been deterred by more conventional approaches to punishment, must be isolated from
society in order to protect the public safety.” 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003).
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many lawmakers believe that there is a deterrence gap. Since the early
1970s, the average prison sentence in the United States nearly has tripled
in length,108 and the number of inmates in prison has increased from
216,000 to 2,173,800.109 There also seems to be a perception that whitecollar criminals are being systematically underdeterred. This has led
lawmakers repeatedly to ratchet-up both fines and prison sentences for
white-collar crimes.110
2. Undeterrable Offenders
Undeterrable offenders are those who cannot be deterred, regardless of
the sanction.111 What does one mean when one says that an offender cannot
be deterred?112 An offender cannot be deterred if her expected benefit is
greater than any potential penalty. With some offenses, such as terrorist
attacks and shooting sprees in public places, there is a very high
probability that the offender may die during the commission of the crime.
In other words, the probability of the maximum possible sentence—
death—is almost 100%, and thus the expected costs to an offender from
committing such a crime are higher than those for any other possible
crime.113 The inability to deter this sort of offender may be based on other
factors, such as mental illness, sociopathy, or drug addiction. Heat of
passion offenses are equally difficult to deter.
When an offender cannot be deterred, society has to determine whether
the harm from their offense is greater than the costs of preventing the
crime altogether. The increased use of digital surveillance, intelligence
policing, and preventive policing generally is aimed, in part, at dealing
with offenders who are immune to deterrence.
108

Darley, supra note 104, at 190.
DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
2015 2 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2015).
110
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides for enhanced criminal penalties for white-collar offenders.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 807, 116 Stat. 745, 804 (2002) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1348) (detailing corporate and criminal fraud accountability); id. §§ 902–05 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1349) (providing penalty enhancements for white collar crime); id. § 1106 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a)) (providing penalties for any person who willfully and knowingly provides false and
misleading statement to the Securities Exchange Commission). This Act exposes an additional puzzle
of the neoclassical approach: the fact that lawmakers routinely adopt imprisonment sanctions for
offenders, such as white-collar criminals, who have sufficient disposable wealth to pay optimal fines.
See Garoupa, supra note 20, at 271 (explaining that in the United States, and much less in Europe,
policymakers resort to prison sentences before exhausting fines).
111
See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 40–46
(2003) (describing various properties of undeterrable offenders).
112
See United States v. Griffin, 543 Fed. Appx. 789, 793 (10th Cir. 2013) (offender undeterred
from criminal activity notwithstanding “numerous contacts with the criminal justice system”).
113
Now, of course, some offenders may see a life sentence as providing them with a much higher
aggregate disutility. This would not affect the general claim that these offenders—regardless of the
penalty—are undeterrable.
109

2017]

DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE AND PREVENTIVE POLICING

1483

3. Salient Crimes
So far we have assumed that an offender’s crime creates an objective
ex ante harm, in the sense that the level of harm does not vary after the fact
based on how the crime is perceived by third parties. Some crimes—
gruesome murders, shooting sprees, and terrorist acts—are more salient
than others.114 In fact, the aim of terrorism is to perpetrate salient acts that
have a greater impact than the actual harm caused.
When offenders succeed in committing salient crimes, social outrage
leads to stepped-up enforcement activities to prevent future occurrences.115
Salient crimes, over time, will lead to the ratcheting-up of enforcement
activities aimed at total prevention. The enforcement activities for salient
crimes will increase the overall deterrence for other crimes. This means
that the expected sanction for other crimes will increase. This will lead to
overdeterrence, unless society lowers the sanctions for non-salient crimes
that do not call for total deterrence.
D. The Transaction Costs of Crime and Overdeterrence
When offenders commit crimes they take into account two types of
costs: the punishment they will incur, if caught; and the up-front
investments116 they must make in order to plan, execute, and cover-up their
crimes. These transaction costs of crime have not received much attention
in the economic literature on criminal deterrence. This is understandable,
given that under the standard economic approach, the goal is to set
enforcement expenditures as low as possible, while setting gross sanctions
at their maximal level.
But as we have seen, offenders face a much higher likelihood of being
detected and arrested under digital policing regimes. Knowing this, rational
offenders will invest more resources in planning, executing, and coveringup their crimes. Offenders incur these transaction costs in order to increase
the likelihood that they will succeed in their criminal endeavor. Success,
from the offenders’ point of view, includes receiving the benefits they had
114

See Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of
Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 422–32 (2017) (summarizing various reactions by courts and
legislatures to salient crimes, including ratcheting up gross sanctions).
115
Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and
a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453–56 (2009).
116
These transaction costs of criminal misconduct are best labeled as investments since they
require an offender to incur immediate costs at time t in order to produce delayed rewards at time t + 1.
As a general matter, an individual will make an investment at time t, if the immediate costs are less
than the delayed future payoffs, properly discounted to take into account the uncertainty regarding the
delayed payoffs and to account for the offender’s impatience. This long-term impatience, modeled in
the usual fashion, using an exponential function, includes not just psychological based impatience, but
also the general time value of money—which captures the return from investing instead in a risk-free
asset, at the market risk-free return.
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counted on, and escaping justice. The transaction costs of crime will thus
play a larger role in their cost-benefit calculus, when deciding whether or
not to commit a crime. It follows that if society fails to take into account
these transaction costs of crime, offenders will be overdeterred.
1. Planning Crimes Under Uncertainty
During the planning phase, offenders must take into account the
uncertainty surrounding the crime, and determine how much to expend to
acquire information to reduce this uncertainty.117 These immediate
planning expenditures may produce negative returns if the offender decides
not to commit the crime, is caught before he has completed it, or right
afterwards, before he has received the full fruit from his labors.
Offenders may be uncertain about the magnitude of the punishment
that they will face if caught, which will depend on the intricacies of
sentencing guidelines or norms and whether the crime results in injuries,
death, or collateral damage to property. Offenders are often uncertain about
the likelihood that they will be caught, convicted, and punished. A victim
may be an undercover police officer; there may or may not be witnesses,
surveillance cameras, or other means of capturing and preserving other
characteristics of an offender that can later be used to identify and convict
him.
Third parties (who may or may not become an actual victim in a future
crime) may also expend resources to protect themselves from crime,118 and
in doing so, increase the transaction costs faced by offenders. In some
instances, potential victims are in the best position to take precaution
against crime at the lowest cost. For example, a casino owner concerned
that employees will embezzle cash proceeds can install CCTV cameras and
adopt internal control mechanisms119 to detect and punish errant
employees.120 Society can provide an incentive to victims to take greater
precaution by reducing their own enforcement efforts, which will have the
117
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and Economic Behavior, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF
KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 138–40 (4th ed. 1984) (discussing the
role of information in reducing uncertainty and its value to economic actors who are thus willing to pay
to acquire it).
118
See Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON.
197, 198 (1996) (describing under-enforcement scheme aimed at providing victims with incentive to
take precautions).
119
See Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(defining “internal control” mechanism as “a process—effected by an entity's board of directors,
management, and other personnel—designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding . . . : (a)
reliability of financial reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and (c) compliance with
applicable laws and regulations”).
120
See Matthew Bunn & Kathryn M. Glynn, Preventing Insider Theft: Lessons from the Casino
and Pharmaceutical Industries, 41 J. NUCLEAR MATERIALS MGMT. 4, 6 (2013) (describing process of
pre-employment screening and post-employment monitoring, training, and access restriction).
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121

effect of exposing victims to a greater risk of loss. Alternatively, society
can subsidize private actors to undertake due care against crime.122
Similarly, offenders may be uncertain about the expected benefits from
committing a crime. A bank robber may be uncertain about how much
money is in the bank vault; a mugger, about the contents of a victim’s
wallet; a murderer, about the utility that he will receive from seeing the
victim dead.123 Faced with uncertainty about the benefits from crime, an
offender may invest in “searching” for the best possible crime to commit,
in the same way a consumer may search for the best seller of the good she
wants to buy.124
2. Executing Crimes
Offenders also incur transaction costs when they carry out the crime.
Even if there are no immediate monetary outlays, the offender will still
experience immediate disutility from the exertion of effort, the anxiety of
getting caught, and moral conflict.125 One would expect that the amount of
effort and level of anxiety will increase the greater the likelihood that the
offender will be caught in the act. What is important is the offender’s
subjective probability126 that he will encounter resistance from a victim or
that the police will arrest him in medias res or right after completing the
crime. The likelihood that any of these will occur will tend to increase, the
greater the level of digital policing, and the more that society shifts
121
See KEITH HYLTON, AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (describing goal of
providing victims incentive to take due care by exposing them to part of the loss from any enforcement
shortcomings).
122
In other words, if it would cost society $1,000 in enforcement expenditures to deter crime, but
a private party can do so for $250, one can maximize social welfare by making a $250 transfer to the
private party to invest in prevention. For example, they can be given a $250 tax credit if they purchase
and install a CCTV camera.
123
James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 367, 375 (1992)
(finding that criminals consistently miscalculate the net expected benefits of committing crimes).
124
See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 213 (1961)
(discussing consumer search decisions).
125
Even when moral strictures are not sufficient to deter criminal activity, they can still create
internal moral discord. While some criminals are morally bankrupt or at least morally agnostic, one
cannot adopt a blanket assumption. One can plausibly assume that some potential wrongdoers give
weight to moral norms or at least deliberate in their shadow. The cognitive dissonance literature is
concerned with explaining how individuals may, over time, change their internalized moral rules in
order to make them comport more closely with their acts of misconduct. Whether or not a person
engages in this type of moral arbitrage in response to their acts of misconduct, it is likely that such a
person had moral reasons, at least in the back of his mind, when deciding whether or not to engage in
misconduct. In other words, it is unlikely that a person can completely turn off his moral compass, at
least in the deliberate types of misconduct that concern us and which are the ones likely to lead to
dissonance adjustments. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 217–19 (4th ed. 2000)
(providing an overview of the cognitive dissonance literature).
126
See SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 503–04 (noting that, for deterrence purposes, an offender’s
belief of the probability of detection is more important than the actual probability).

1486

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1453

towards preventive policing regimes.
3. Covering-Up Crimes
Criminals must also expend resources and exert effort to avoid
detection after the crime, such as disposing of incriminating evidence and
doing other things to cover-up their tracks.127 These immediate costs can be
higher for repeat offenders and co-conspirators at least to the extent that
their activities involve greater levels of deception, anxiety, and effort at
keeping stories straight and remembering who has been told what, as well
as who may have overheard, detected inconsistencies, or otherwise become
suspicious. Moreover, co-conspirators will need to monitor each other to
assure that no one will defect in order to get a more lenient sentence.128
In conclusion, all other things being equal, the greater the level of
digital policing, the more that offenders will have to invest in planning,
executing, and covering up their crimes. A lawmaker who fails to take
these transaction costs into account will adopt penalty schemes that will
overdeter offenders.
E. Enforcement Errors and Digital Policing
There are two types of errors in criminal enforcement: an individual
who actually committed a crime is “wrongfully acquitted”; or an individual
who did not commit a crime is “wrongfully convicted.”129 Both types of
errors lead to a dilution in the level of deterrence.
If a portion of guilty offenders are wrongfully acquitted, potential
offenders, as a group, will be underdeterred. If innocent individuals are
wrongfully convicted, law abiding citizens, as a group, will have a greater
incentive to violate the law. A potential offender will commit a crime only
if the net benefits from crime are greater than the net benefits from obeying
the law. Suppose that the expected benefits from committing a crime are
$450 and the expected sanctions are $350, leaving a net benefit of $100.
Further suppose that if the offender instead chooses to obey the law, he
will receive a net benefit of $150. An individual, for example, may choose
between exerting effort to commit a crime and exerting effort to engage in
lawful employment, where the efforts from a lawful job yield, in this case,
a net benefit of $150. If the probability of a wrongful conviction is zero,
127
See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1352–60 (2006)
(discussing empirical evidence on avoidance costs incurred by offenders).
128
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1350–53 (2003) (describing
monitoring costs within conspiracies to prevent defections).
129
See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (stating that “finding the truth is a
fundamental goal of our [criminal justice] system”); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)
(identifying that two important properties of the system are assuring that “guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer” (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
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then the potential offender will obey the law, given that the net benefits
from lawful employment exceed the net benefits of crime.
Now suppose that the probability of a wrongful conviction is 0.20.
This means that obeying the law yields a benefit of $150 minus the
wrongfully imposed expected sanctions $350 x 0.20 = $70. The net benefit
from obeying the law, taking into account the likelihood of a wrongful
conviction, is now $80, which is less than the net benefit of $100 that the
offender would receive from committing the crime.
Suppose that digital policing reduces the likelihood of wrongful
acquittals and wrongful convictions. Since both types of errors dilute the
overall level of deterrence, reducing these errors would increase the overall
level of deterrence. If lawmakers want to keep the level of deterrence at the
same level as before, then they would have to either reduce the gross
sanctions or the probability of detection. Digital policing, as we have seen,
leads to an increase in the probability of detections. It follows that
lawmakers would have to reduce the gross sanctions in order to keep the
level of deterrence the same.
Suppose instead that digital policing leads to an increase in both types
of error. Increasing digital surveillance, for example, can in some instances
increase the likelihood of a wrongful conviction. Certain types of digital
surveillance will be given undue weight by juries. This is true of DNA,
which can both decrease and increase the likelihood of wrongful
convictions.130 Moreover, individuals who appear in police databases, due
to prior convictions, prior arrests, Terry stops, or for other reasons, are
more likely to show up on police dashboards and police suspect lists.
Recorded individuals make more salient suspects, which can lead to
wrongful convictions.
As we have seen, when the probability of error increases, deterrence is
diluted. Lawmakers, therefore, would have to increase the expected
sanctions to keep the level of deterrence the same. This means that they
would either have to increase the probability of detection or the gross
sanctions.
F. Marginal Deterrence and Digital Policing
Some crimes cause more harm than others. If sanctions for each
possible crime are set to the optimal level, then an offender will properly
internalize the harm that he creates, regardless of the crime that he chooses
130
See Manuel A. Utset, Telling Differences: Observational Equivalence and Wrongful
Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 49, 79 (2008) (discussing the tendency of DNA evidence to increase
rather than decrease potential mistaken convictions “whenever a jury gives undue weight to the
invariance condition . . . and not enough weight to potential variance conditions—for example, the fact
that an innocent defendant’s DNA could have been left behind at the crime scene for some other
reason”).
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to commit. But sanctions, as we have seen, are not always set optimally.
Suppose that this is the case, and an offender, who is undeterred, is
choosing between a more harmful and less harmful crime. A lawmaker
would want to incentivize the offender to choose the less harmful crime. It
can do so by setting the expected sanctions for the more harmful crime
higher than those for the less harmful crime. More generally, marginal
deterrence requires that a lawmaker adopts a penalty scheme in which
more serious crimes are penalized more heavily.
As we saw above, under digital policing, enforcement is more general
in nature. General enforcement equalizes the probability of detections
across different crimes. This leaves lawmakers with one option for
achieving marginal deterrence: a system of escalating gross sanctions in
which more serious crimes get penalized more heavily. However, there is a
limit to how high one can set sanctions.
It follows that digital policing’s general enforcement approach should
lead to a reduction of the gross penalty for less harmful crimes. But gross
sanctions can only be reduced so much—at some point the only solution
would be to decriminalize the less serious crimes.
IV. OTHER CRIMINAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF DIGITAL POLICING
This Section develops some additional implications from the
expansion of digital and preventive policing. It begins by examining the
interaction between preventive policing and an offender’s bounded
rationality. It then argues that preventive policing can be characterized as
an analogue of “incapacitation.” This Section then examines the
relationship between preventive policing and inchoate crimes, such as
criminal attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation, as well as their relationship
with the entrapment defense. Section IV concludes by examining the
implications of digital and preventive policing on police searches, on plea
bargains, and police corruption.
A. The Bounded Rationality of Offenders
When crimes do not call for total deterrence, the goal of criminal
sanctions is to cause offenders to internalize the social harm produced by
their crimes. To do so efficiently, society needs to signal as clearly as
possible the probability of detection and the gross sanctions. But
committing crimes is a complex undertaking. In deciding whether to
commit a crime, an offender will need to make probability assessments
about the expected benefits and expected costs of committing a crime, both
of which require further probabilistic assessments regarding such matters
as the level of law enforcement and vigilance, prophylactic actions of
potential victims, and gross sanctions. When offenders have bounded
rationality, society should make information about expected sanctions not
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only clear but salient as well. Salience, in other words, is one way of
overcoming an offender’s potential bounded rationality and inattention.
If offenders are risk averse, then there is an even greater incentive for
society to reduce the uncertainty faced by inattentive offenders. The police
can make their enforcement presence salient by using uniformed officers or
by installing CCTV cameras that are easy to identify. Society may also
want to reduce the discretion given to the police, prosecutors, and judges,
regarding enforcement activities and gross sanctions, since discretion
increases the uncertainty faced by offenders.
B. Incapacitation
In the real world, there is a greater amount of imprisonment than what
the economics approach would predict. One possible explanation is that if
offenders are behind bars they are unable to commit other crimes. In
prison, offenders have no real privacy—at an extreme, they are subject to
continual surveillance.131 But from a social welfare perspective, one must
also take into account the costs of administering the prison system and the
tangible and intangible costs borne by the offender.
Since the goal is to minimize aggregate social costs, it really does not
matter how this “incapacitation” occurs. In fact, one economic rationale for
the parole system and halfway houses is to allow for partial incapacitation:
parole officers are able to more directly monitor released offenders and
determine whether they are reverting to lives of crime. Once an offender is
in the system, it is easier to surveil her. New surveillance technologies give
the police instant dashboard access to the background of potential suspects.
This will allow the police to better prevent potential repeat offenders from
reoffending. This sort of real-time deterrence brought about by digital and
preventive policing regimes can be seen as a substitute for incapacitation.
C. Preventive Policing and Inchoate Offenses
The criminal law punishes offenders who, with the requisite culpable
state of mind,132 harm others.133 Some crimes, however, punish offenders,
131
See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon: Or, The Inspection-House, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 40–41 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (proposing the Panopticon, a prison designed so that
inmates could be constantly observed by a single watchman); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200–01 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995) (discussing Bentham’s
Panopticon).
132
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1 (2d ed. 2003).

An individual convicted of a crime may lose his freedom and be
stigmatized. Not surprisingly, criminal law requires clear statements of the
types of actions that will trigger liability—moreover, courts will interpret
the law narrowly whenever there is ambiguity or vagueness. See Rose v.
133
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notwithstanding the fact that they did not harm anyone. These inchoate
crimes include criminal attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. Inchoate
crimes are difficult to explain under both the economics and retributivist
approaches to criminal law.134 With the increased prominence of digital
and preventive policing, one would expect that law enforcement will make
increased use of inchoate offenses.
1. Criminal Attempt
Criminal attempt allows the police to arrest an offender before they
have completed a crime. An individual will trigger inchoate liability for
criminal attempt whenever he has taken substantial steps toward the
commission of the underlying crime.135 If A shoots at B with the intent of
killing her, but misses, he is chargeable for attempted murder.136 If it turns
out that A thought was B was really a “dummy” that looked like B, A
nonetheless triggers attempt liability.137 Finally, if A raises his rifle and
takes aim at B, but the police intervene in the nick of time, before he has
fired, A is once again chargeable for attempt, given that aiming the rifle at
B is sufficient to constitute a substantial step.138 Attempt liability, in short,
is an important tool for preventive policing regimes, since it allows the
police to stop a crime before it has reached a point of no return, when the
harm has been unleashed.
2. Conspiracy and Solicitation
Conspiracy and solicitation are also useful tools for preventive
policing. Conspiracy liability is triggered whenever two or more
Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that criminal law
must give adequate warning of what is prohibited); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170–71 (1972) (striking down an ordinance for
giving too much discretion to police in its application).
134
From a retributivist perspective, an offender is punished because his actions have harmed
others, and thus he deserves to be punished, but a person who shoots at another and misses does not
directly harm the intended victim and does not deserve to be punished. See Leo Katz, Why the
Successful Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791, 795 (2000)
(describing difficulty for retributivist in dealing with inchoate offenses); Leo Zaibert, The Moralist
Strikes Back, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 139, 145 (2011) (describing how the punishment of the deserving
legitimizes the system).
135
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“[Criminal attempt is] an act or
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in [the offender’s]
commission of the crime.”).
136
See id. § 5.01(1)(b) (including cases in which the action or omission is done with belief that
“without further conduct on his part” it would result in crime).
137
See id. § 5.01(1)(a) (including cases in which the offender “purposely engages in conduct that
would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be”).
138
See id. § 5.01(1)(c) (including cases in which the offender is interrupted in the criminal act and
cannot complete it).
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individuals agree to engage in criminal conduct or aid in the commission of
a crime.139 Unlike attempts, there is no need for conspirators to take
substantial steps toward the commission of the underlying crime; all that is
needed is for them to reach an agreement.140 Moreover, while a wrongdoer
may only be charged for an attempt or the actual offense,141 co-conspirators
can be charged and convicted for being part of the conspiracy, as well as
for any offense committed by any of the conspirators.142
An offender triggers liability for solicitation to commit a crime “if with
the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands,
encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that
would constitute such [a] crime.”143 An offender may commit the crime
himself or delegate its execution to a second party—a rational offender
will delegate the commission of a crime whenever he determines that the
expected benefits are greater than the aggregate expected cost from
delegation.144 Like criminal attempt and conspiracy, the crime of
solicitation allows law enforcement to intervene earlier in the criminal
process and prevent potential crimes.
D. Preventive Policing and Entrapment
Preventive policing often uses undercover officers. While undercover
techniques are useful for a variety of crimes that are not susceptible to
traditional enforcement procedures, they increase the potential for police
139
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (explaining that conspiracy liability is
triggered when a person agrees with another “to engage in conduct that constitutes [a] crime or an
attempt or solicitation to commit such crime” or “agrees to aid [another] in the planning or commission
of such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such a crime”). See also Pettibone v. United
States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893) (“A conspiracy is . . . a combination of two or more persons, by
concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means . . . .”).
140
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). This is the case in common law
conspiracies; however, some conspiracy statutes require some overt action toward commission of the
underlying crime. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.20 (Consol. 1998).
141
See LAFAVE, supra note 133, § 11.5(c) (describing the merger rule for criminal attempt).
142
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643–44, 646–47 (1946) (holding that a defendant
can be convicted for both conspiracy and the underlying offense); LAFAVE, supra note 133, § 12.2(b).
143
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (defining criminal solicitation and
also defining solicitation to mean an act that would constitute an attempt or would trigger complicity
liability).
144
Suppose that A wants to break into B’s house and steal a valuable painting. If A carries out the
crime alone he will keep all of the proceeds and bear the expected cost from the burglary—the
planning, execution, and cover-up costs, as well as the expected sanctions for stealing the painting. A,
however, may decide that he prefers to delegate the criminal task to C. He may do so because he
believes that C is a more efficient thief in the sense that he can accomplish the crime at a lower
expected cost—including the likelihood of being detected. A may also decide to delegate because he
does not want to bear the direct and salient disutility from committing the crime. Direct involvement is
more likely to trigger disutility from violating moral strictures, for example.
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misconduct. Under the Model Penal Code, a defense is available when
the police employ “methods of persuasion or inducement that create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.”146 This entrapment defense makes
economic sense: the goal of deterrence is to deter offenders who planned to
commit crimes that would harm third parties, not to use enforcement
resources to stimulate unplanned criminal activity.147
E. Surveillance and Warrants
Each time that an offender commits a crime, she leaves behind an
evidence trace that can, if detected, affect her future wellbeing. In order to
arrest an offender, the police must have probable cause. To show cause the
police must present particularized evidence, coming from public or private
sources. Public evidence includes any piece of evidence available to the
police without getting a search warrant. Private evidence requires the
police to first get a search warrant.
In order to avoid detection, an offender will have an incentive to
minimize the amount of public evidence. In some instances, there will not
be sufficient public evidence to allow the police to make an arrest or even
to get a search warrant to get access to private evidence.
As the costs of digital surveillance have gone down, the ability of the
police to observe and gather public evidence of crimes has increased. This,
in turn, has made it easier to get search warrants and gather sufficient
evidence to have probable cause to make an arrest. The focus on the
public/privacy divide in search warrant jurisprudence has given an
incentive to the police to invest in surveillance technology that allows them
to observe and gather a greater amount of crime-related public evidence.
At the same time, it has led some offenders to invest in technology, such as
cryptography, that reduces the amount of evidence that is in the public
sphere.
F. Plea Bargains and Surveillance
To the extent that digital surveillance and other preventive policing
techniques allow the authorities to collect a greater amount of evidence, it
will increase the probability that an offender, once caught and brought to
trial, will be convicted. This will increase the likelihood that an offender
145
See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441–42 (1932) (stating that “[a]rtifice and
stratagem may be employed” by police because they are often necessary “to reveal the criminal
design,” but not “when the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense”).
146
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
147
See SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 564–65 (arguing that individuals who had not intended to
commit crimes do not need to be deterred).
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will agree to a plea bargain. In a plea bargain, like in other bargaining
scenarios, two parties are trying to decide whether to settle or take the case
to trial.
A bargaining breakdown, and thus a trial, is more likely the greater the
uncertainty about the outcome of the trial. If the authorities are able to
reduce this uncertainty by gathering more evidence, they are in essence
reducing the variance around a defendant’s expected costs from going to
trial. By reducing the variance, the defendant will be able to make a more
accurate assessment about the expected costs from proceeding to a trial. As
long as the settlement offer is less than these expected costs, offenders will
be more likely agree to the plea bargain.
G. Corruption and Law Enforcement.
Increased surveillance should lead to a decrease in the level of police
corruption. This is particularly the case when offenders are surveilled
through multiple means by multiple parties. For example, assume that the
authorities have three sources of surveillance and that each is carried out
by a different agency. This means that if one monitor decides to collude
with the offender, there is still a possibility that one or both of the other
monitors will still gather enough evidence to arrest and convict the
offender. Once arrested, the offender will have an incentive to turn on his
collusion partner in return for a lighter sentence. Additionally, the very act
of collusion between the offender and monitor may be recorded by the
other monitors. In either case, increased surveillance, particularly when
carried out by overlapping monitors, will lead to a reduction in police
corruption.
CONCLUSION
Technology advances have helped change the face of law enforcement.
They have led to the increased use of digital policing and preventive
policing. Both of these create important privacy and criminal procedure
concerns. While commentators and policymakers have given great
attention to these concerns, they have largely overlooked a set of collateral
effects brought about by digital and preventive policing. This Article
identified and examined the implications for deterrence theory and the
substantive criminal law of the proliferation of digital policing.
It shows that digital policing techniques help reduce the complexity of
law enforcement and create economies of scale. It also shows that by
reducing the complexity of law enforcement, digital policing has allowed
society to shift its enforcement focus from investigative policing to
preventive policing, which is a much more complex undertaking. The
Article’s main contribution is showing that digital and preventive policing
will lead to inefficient overdeterrence, unless lawmakers reduce the gross
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sanctions for criminal misconduct. This is true for first-time offenders and
for repeat offenders. But in the latter case, the problem is magnified by the
fact that the digital footprint left behind by an offender who is caught and
convicted will make it much easier for the authorities to identify, arrest,
and convict repeat offenders.

